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EVENTS, TIME AND THE SIMPLE FORM 
Walter H. Hirtle 
A linguistic system is the subconscious 
organization the mind imposes on its own 
representations. (Guillaume 1984:103) 
Introduction 
Even a cursory survey of the literature shows an extraordinary variety of 
observations concerning the use of the simple form of the English verb. Insofar as 
this variety reflects the reality of discourse, it suggests that we are getting a far more 
precise view of usage than that presented in most grammars. Nonetheless when 
confronted with so many diverse observations — and we can expect to have more 
such facts as our observation of discourse becomes more refined — the grammarian-
linguist cannot have a feeling of satisfaction. On the contrary he feels a certain 
frustration because inherent in his approach to language is a desire to understand it as 
a phenomenon, not merely describe its various manifestations. And a set of concrete 
facts such as these does not explain anything, but rather calls for an explanation since 
'in itself the concrete may be observed, but not understood1, as Guillaume (1984:43) 
points out. 
The problem then is to reach an understanding of how it comes about that the 
verb in the simple form can be used in so many different ways. The approach 
adopted here will not be to generalize on the basis of observed facts, to formalize 
observations as some scholars have done (cf. Leech 1969, Dowty 1977), but rather to 
attempt to discern the conditions giving rise to the various uses of the verb, an 
attempt based both on the observed facts and on what appear to be necessary 
components of any verb. Although this approach, which is based on the 
Psychomechanics of Language (cf. Guillaume 1984 passim for the main tenets), is by 
no means easier than other approaches, it is preferred because, being of an operational 
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type — it seeks what precedes and leads up to the observed facts — it holds more 
promise of throwing light on how the speaker produces a given effect and hence of 
providing an explanation of usage of the type found in other sciences based on 
observation. 
In our approach it is assumed that each grammatical form has one underlying 
meaning through which it entertains systematic relations with other forms in the 
system. This underlying, or more precisely, POTENTIAL meaning (cf. Hirtle 1982: 
40) may be actualized in different ways in usage, but the resulting senses are then 
seen as ACTUAL meanings, i.e. as the several consequences of the single prior 
condition. This approach differs radically from one 'founded on the assumption that 
grammatical features ... can have more than one SEPARATE meaning' (Leech 1969: 
152; my emphasis). It provides an elegant means of dealing with the crucial problem 
of polysemy (cf. Hirtle in press) and so permits us to understand how a single 
morphological form can have several senses in discourse and yet serve as an effective 
instrument for thought and communication. The main aim of the present paper then 
is to examine different uses of the simple form, the different types of event it can 
express, in an effort to bring to light the meaning potential of the form that gives 
rise to these observed contextual senses. 
Before turning to a discussion of the different uses of the simple form 
mentioned by various observers, a terminological problem must be settled: how to 
designate something which is common to all verbs. The term EVENT, although used 
in a more restricted sense by some authors, will be used here in this broad sense. 
Thus we can say that every verb expresses an event and, as it will become clear, only 
verbs can express events. This view is based on the commonly accepted notion that 
an event necessarily involves time and on the idea, which comes to us from Aristotle 
(cf. Michael 1970: 56), that this is precisely what distinguishes a verb from other 
types of word: besides its lexical meaning, a verb incorporates a formal (= 
grammatical) representation of time, or in the more elegant terminology of the 
Middle Ages (cf. Padley 1976: 35ff.), a verb CONSIGNIHES time. It is by exploring 
and extending this initial insight, and particularly by focusing on the time involved 
in the duration of the event, that we can gain some understanding of how the 
surprising variety of usage of the simple form comes about. 
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Vendler's Types 
ACCOMPLISHMENTS AND ACHIEVEMENTS. The well known article by Vendler 
'Verbs and Times' resumed previous work on types of verb and prompted much 
further discussion so it provides a convenient starting point. He sets out to examine 
how particular verbs 'presuppose and involve the notion of time' above and beyond 
the obvious past, present and future distinctions (p.97). (This time will be called 
EVENT TIME here because it is involved in, contained in, every event.) He attempts 
therefore to focus attention 'primarily upon the time schemata presupposed by 
various verbs' (p. 98). To this end he distinguishes four types of event, two of 
which, ACCOMPLISHMENTS and ACHIEVEMENTS1, provide a clear view of the time 
involved. Accomplishments 'proceed toward a terminus' (p. 101) as in: 
He ran a mile. 
I drew a circle. 
where the verbs depict events as fully realized; one could say an accomplishment 
represents the beginning, middle and end of an event in time. He describes 
achievements on the other hand as events that 'occur at a single moment' (p. 103), as 
in: 
We reached the top at noon sharp. 
She spotted the plane at 10:53 AM. 
Here too the verbs depict events as fully realized, with their beginning, middle and 
end in time. From the point of view of consignified time, the difference between the 
two types is clear: whereas accomplishments last for an appreciable time, 
achievements are of extremely short duration, so short in fact that they cannot be 
represented as divided. Consequently achievements are not found in the progressive, 
as Vendler points out, nor, as Dowty brings out (1979:181), with finish : 
1. Although Mourelatos (1978) rightly characterizes Vendler's terminology as implying 
human agency, these terms will be retained here for the moment since our aim is to distinguish 
between them on the grounds, not of agent, but of the representation of time. 
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*She finished spotting the plane at 10:53 AM. 
In terms of event time, of the time constituting the duration of the event, the middle, 
separating the initial and final instants, is reduced to a minimum in achievements, 
whereas in accomplishments the period between the beginning and the end of the 
event is greater than minimal. The interesting point here is that the two types are 
distinguished on the basis of something inherent in every event, namely its duration 
or event time. Since it is represented in every verb, event time is sufficiently general 
to provide a basis for examining all uses of the verb. 
Before going on to discuss other types, however, it will be useful to point out 
with Mourelatos (1978) that the distinction between accomplishments and 
achievements should not be taken as reflecting types of verb lexeme, "hard and fast 
categories into which we can split verbs once and for all', as Dowty (1979: 182) puts 
it. Rather, it characterizes how a verb is used in a given context to evoke a particular 
experience of the speaker. That is to say, this first distinction shows how the lexeme 
is like the matter of a verb which is variously moulded by the grammatical forms of 
the verb in view of the message to be expressed. Thus we can contrast the above 
example of reached expressing an achievement with the following: 
We finished reaching the top at noon sharp. 
Here the speaker represents the event as taking an appreciable time (as when a 
straggling group is involved in the experience he wishes to express), so the verb here 
expresses an accomplishment. Similarly in: 
/ crossed the border at noon. 
the event's duration is depicted as minimal, whereas it is more than minimal in: 
It took the battalion twenty minutes to cross the border. 
Calling this sentence an 'oddity' (cf. Vendler 1967: 104n) arises from mistakenly 
considering the achievement/accomplishment distinction as an inherent characteristic 
of the lexical elements involved rather than, as argued here, two ways of fitting the 
lexical import to the different grammatical frames provided by the event time. In 
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short, it is misleading to classify verbs according to these types; only uses in 
particular sentences can be so categorized. 
Also requiring comment here is the notion of duration as applied to 
achievements. Can we properly speak of event time in such cases? Some authors 
in fact speak of 'instantaneous' events, like those in: 
He shoots! 
Walker ducks! 
as 'having no duration' (Leech 1971: 15), 'not even duration of a very short period' 
(Comrie 1976: 42). This way of viewing achievements creates a serious difficulty: 
how can one imagine (or even perceive!) an event which occupies no time, that is, an 
event whose end does not come after its beginning? On the other hand if we accept 
with the OED that an instant is 'an infinitely short space of time', or that it is the 
shortest perceivable or imaginable space of time (cf. Valin 1971: 35f.), then we can 
speak of such events as having a minimal duration, as involving the shortest 
possible space of time. And indeed the happenings depicted in the above examples of 
sports commentaries can, in a slow motion replay, be seen to occupy time. 
Perhaps the extreme case in the representation of short events is provided by 
those involving an abrupt transition from one state to another, as in: 
The power went off at midnight. 
Even though in our experience the transition has no duration — the situation of the 
power being off follows immediately that of it being on — to represent this 
transition by means of a verb requires us to depict both the final instant of the prior 
situation and the initial instant of the succeeding situation. It further requires that the 
limit between the two states be represented. In order to imagine a limit, however, we 
must give it a minimal space in time. Thus even here the event is represented with a 
beginning, a middle and an end, because the infinitesimally small can be represented 
only by means of a positive quantity. The point here is that we cannot represent an 
event without some duration, some event time. 
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ACTIVITIES. Achievements and accomplishments have been grouped by some 
authors into a single type, PERFORMANCES, characterized by the fact that they are 
end-oriented, telic. As such, performances can be contrasted with Vendler's third type 
of event, ACTIVITIES, because events of this type are open-ended. They do not 
'proceed toward a terminus' but 'consist of successive phases following one another in 
time' (p. 99); they 'go on in time in a homogeneous way' (p. 101). Thus verbal 
notions such as 'running, walking, swimming, pushing or pulling something and the 
like are almost unambiguous cases of activity' (p. 107). As a consequence of its 
having no inherent conclusion, an activity can be said to have taken place regardless 
of whether it goes on for a long time or a short time. Thus what appears to 
distinguish an activity from the first two types in Vendler's eyes is that any point in 
its development could serve as a final instant, whereas the finalist or telic nature of 
performances calls for a representation of their point of completion as their final 
instant. 
This is why some scholars distinguish activities from the first two types 
(performances) on the basis of their respective lexical import. However a problem 
arises when one tries to give examples of activities in the simple form. For 
example, Mourelatos (1978:427) is of the opinion that the sentence: 
He pushed the cart. 
'could, doubtless, without any other adverbial, have the import of a process [= 
activity] predication in a suitable context.' Unfortunately a suitable context is not 
immediately obvious, and in fact when one tries to imagine a plausible context for 
the sentence, one ends up with either an achievement sense of 'gave it a push' (cf. 
Why did you hit your little brother? He pushed the cart after I told him not to touch 
it.) or an accomplishment sense like 'propulsing it over a certain distance' (cf. How 
did you get everything here? He pushed the cart and I pulled it.) Even in an example 
like: 
He pushed the cart for hours. 
one could hardly claim that the event is seen as open-ended because there is a lexical 
expression of the event's total duration. If one can judge by the resulting message, 
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the speaker had in mind the whole action from beginning to end. This is why even a 
sentence like: 
He pushed the cart twice for hours. 
can make sense in a suitable context (as for example when trying to give reasons for 
the subject's heart attack), and in that situation can hardly be considered 'nonsense1 
(Mourelatos 1978:427). 
A similar restriction arises when we try to situate another example of the 
simple form sometimes given as expressing an activity: 
He swam on Thanksgiving. 
Every time one tries to imagine this as a real sentence (i.e. spoken in a particular 
situation), the verb carries us through to the end of the stretch of time occupied by 
the event. One might understand it in the sense of 'participated in a race' (if the 
subject is in competition swimming) or of 'had a swim' (if the subject simply wished 
to show his courage on a cold day) or in some other way, but the simple form always 
evokes the complete space of event time. As a consequence it can take adverbials 
like three times which, according to Mourelatos, characterize performances. 
It seems then that examples of activities in the simple form are, to say the 
least, suspect. The problem here is by no means uncommon and calls for the often 
repeated but seldom heeded warning about commenting on self-made examples quite 
fictitiously isolated from any situation or speaker. In reality, a sentence is always 
the expression of some experience of a speaker and can only be safely observed and 
analyzed as such. In this respect, examples of activities like the following can easily 
be situated by the reader in an appropriate context and so are quite acceptable: 
He is thinking about Jones. 
It is snowing. 
However, since such examples involve the progressive form they cannot be 
profitably examined within the confines of this article. 
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The point of all this is not to deny that there is a lexical distinction to be 
made between activities and performances which is useful for those whose major 
concern is the notional import signified by verbs. Rather it is to suggest that unless 
more convincing evidence from real usage is brought forward the distinction between 
activities and performances cannot be considered valid for the grammatical analysis of 
the simple form because it is not based on different time schemata, different formal 
representations of event time consignified by the verb. Our discussion has 
nonetheless served a double purpose. First, it has shown how the simple form 
imposes its own organization on the lexical representations presented to it. More 
important, it has brought out a crucial grammatical point concerning the 
representation of event time: that whenever an achievement, an accomplishment or 
an activity is thought in — is represented by means of — the simple form, we are 
obliged to see it from the beginning to the end of its duration. 
This point has been brought out in other studies. Smith (1983) remarks that 
the simple form evokes the three event types with 'endpoints'. A more extended 
discussion of examples is found in Hirtlel967, where it is shown that, besides the 
'instantaneous' type mentioned above, a number of other uses of the simple form 
evoke the complete duration of an event as either seen or foreseen at the moment of 
speech, for example: 
I resign! (performative) 
The Queen walks slowly to the throne, (comment of a ceremonial act) 
Here they come! (comment of an expected event) 
The story is about a man who goes to London and makes his fortune. 
(summary) 
She takes up her hat, puts it on and walks across the room, (stage direction)2 
2. Among other uses discussed in this study was that of the simple form to express 
future events as scheduled, for example: 
He retires next year. 
More recent research (Hirtle and Curat 1986) has shown that it was a mistake to consider that 
this use evokes the duration of the event from beginning to end. 
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In fact if there were no other event types one would be tempted to characterize the 
simple form as a perfective in the sense that it calls to mind the full extent of the 
event's duration in time. However the fourth type of event soon shows that this 
view of the simple form would be untenable. 
STATES. The fourth type mentioned by Vendler is STATES which 'last for a period 
of time' (p. 103) and 'can be broken down into time instants' (p. 114). That is to say, 
states are represented with duration and so must be considered to be events. However 
states 'are not processes going on in time' (p. 102) and so differ from other types of 
event in excluding any development, change or successive realization. Even 
activities, which in some respects involve a uniform process, 'consist of successive 
phases following one another in time' as in the repeated movements of running. 
Consequently performances and activities all resemble actions in that they are carried 
out, they occur in time, whereas states can only be said to exist in time and the 
subject does nothing. The distinction between these two basic types of event is 
today widely accepted under various names such as dynamic/stative, action-like/state-
like, and so on. 
From the point of view of event time, the striking thing about verbs 
expressing a state is the fact that the simple form does not generally evoke a state's 
total duration. To say: 
The air smells of jasmine. 
calls to mind neither the beginning nor the end of the state, but merely evokes the 
situation at the moment of speaking. As has been pointed out elsewhere (cf. Hirtle 
1967: 45ff, Dowty 1979: 71) it is this representation of just one moment of the 
event's duration that characterizes verbs expressing a state and distinguishes them 
from verbs expressing action-like events. 
The moment of event time evoked by a verb expressing a state may belong to 
events which, in terms of extra-linguistic reality, are of various lengths. In the 
above example the represented moment, which coincides with the moment of speech, 
belongs to an event with a vaguely defined duration which is felt to extend beyond 
the moment depicted, as suggested by other elements in the sentence ( e.g. the 
relative impermanence of the smell of jasmine in the atmosphere). Although this is 
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by far the most common expressive effect, it is not the only one found. On occasion 
the moment evoked by the simple form may in fact correspond to the total duration 
of some extra-linguistic situation, as in the following example: 
It is exactly midnight. 
On the other hand the moment evoked grammatically by the verb may be implied to 
belong to a situation of limitless duration, as in: 
The Earth is round. 
The difference of expressive effect between examples like the last two is quite 
considerable and it is no doubt this which has led to widely varying views of the 
simple form. It is sometimes described as expressing all time, past, present and 
future, in total disregard of its tense, and sometimes as expressing no duration (cf. 
Freed 1979: 75), in spite of the fact that, as mentioned above, we cannot represent an 
event as requiring no time. This diversity of sentence meaning to which the simple 
form expressing a state can contribute should not lead one to propose that there is, 
for each such expressive effect, a different time schema underlying the form. Rather 
it is being proposed here that the same representation of event time is involved in all 
such uses because what is expressed here is a state, an event involving no change or 
development. Because a state is absolutely homogeneous, a single moment may be 
seen either as the total duration of an event which lasts only a moment or as typical 
of all the other moments of a more lengthy event. The important point here is the 
need to distinguish carefully between the stretch of event time represented by means 
of the verb and the total sentence meaning or expressive effect arising from 
combining the import of each of the elements in the context. (The need to take into 
account all elements in a context to explain the expressive effect can be illustrated by 
replacing the Earth in the last example with the bubble ; although there is no change 
in the verb, the suggestion of an 'eternal truth' no longer arises.) Unfortunately this 
distinction is often neglected in the literature with misleading results. 
All of this is not intended to imply that the distinction between the two major 
types of event is as clearly visible in every use of the simple form as our illustrative 
examples might suggest. Human experience being endlessly varied, some situations 
call clearly for representation and expression as a dynamic event, others as a stative 
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event, but there are situations which permit both interpretations and may well give 
rise to sentences where the distinction is barely discernible. This is often the case 
with the verbs of perception. Nevertheless if the two major types of event reflect 
two manners of representing event time — and that is the thesis being proposed here 
— then the speaker, influenced perhaps by the most subde and fugitive impressions 
arising from his experience, must opt for one or the other and so represent either the 
carrying out, the happening, of the event or simply some moment of its existence, 
thereby giving rise respectively to the expression of a dynamic, rapid-cadence event or 
a stative, slow-cadence event 
Two Types of Event 
Our discussion so far has by and large confirmed the findings of other 
grammarians, a number of whom agree that states constitute a type of event quite 
different from the action-like type seen in achievements, accomplishments and 
activities. We have also attempted to get behind impressionistic descriptions like 
'stative' or 'slow-cadence' and 'dynamic' or 'rapid-cadence' in order to see the time 
schemata giving rise to such impressions. It has been observed that, underlying the 
various types of verb lexeme found in discourse, there are two ways of representing 
event time: 
1) a 'full-length' representation found in action-like events, including their 
beginning (B) and their end (E), as in the following schema: 
2) a 'momentary' representation found in state-like events which could be 
schematically depicted as follows: 
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The impression of moving rapidly from beginning to end in the former type gives 
rise to the dynamic, rapid-cadence effect, whereas the evoking of a single moment in 
the latter suggests that there is no movement involved (other than that of time in 
general, of universe time) to produce a stative or slow-cadence effect. Such would 
seem to be the formal representations of event time, the time schemata, underlying 
the two types of event expressed by the simple form. 
The four uses discussed by Vendler do not exhaust all the possibilities of the 
simple form. To help show that the two time schemata proposed above underlie other 
uses, we shall examine briefly one mentioned by numerous writers, that involving 
repetition or habit. Again it will be important to distinguish between what the 
lexical component and what the grammatical component of the verb contribute to 
this use — between what is signified and what is consignified — in order to discern 
just how the event is represented in terms of our constant grammatical parameter, 
event time. 
The expression of iterativity is complicated by the fact that it seems to have 
two facets, repetition and habit The former involves a series of repeated actions, the 
actual occurrence of a set of identical processes as in: 
He walked to work all last summer. 
Here one gets the impression of an accomplishment, walking to work, repeated daily 
over a given period of time. This is quite different from what is usually considered 
habit in the grammars. For example in: 
He walks to work. 
there is no suggestion of a stretch of time within which the walking to work is 
realized over and over again. On the other hand, expressed in the progressive this 
sentence would suggest a limited or temporary set of repetitions, not a habit. 
Considerations of this sort concerning iterative uses lead to the distinction 
between verbs expressing a repeated action, a series, and those expressing a habit. 
The distinction becomes much clearer when the term 'habit* is understood in the sense 
of a disposition or tendency to carry out the action periodically. In contrast, a series 
of repeated actions evokes the effectual carrying out of the action on successive 
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occasions, the actualizing of the disposition or tendency. The interesting thing about 
regarding iterative events in this twofold fashion is that it leads us back to the 
familiar ground of event types already known. In effect, a disposition or tendency is 
a characteristic and so is attributed to the subject as a state. As in any other 
expression of a state, the simple form here evokes what exists at the moment, any 
impression of development or change being excluded. This is why the progressive 
form cannot evoke a habit in this sense. In this respect Vendler's suggestion (p. 108) 
that occupations and abilities, like dispositions, are states appears to be well founded. 
However since a habit is of the nature of a potential oriented toward actualization in 
the performance or doing of a series of actions, some hesitate to consider a habit as 
an ordinary state. To mark this distinction, which is purely lexical, one should 
perhaps speak of a habit as a STATE-LIKE EVENT, in the sense that its event time is 
represented just as in ordinary states. A series of repeated actions, on the other hand, 
can be justly described as consisting 'of successive phases following one another in 
time' as Vendler describes activities. That is to say, a repeated action involves a 
certain uniformity in its realization, reminiscent of that observed in activities. 
Furthermore such events, like activities, are represented in the full span of their event 
time when in the simple form, but in the progressive depict merely a moment of 
their development, leaving their duration open-ended. 
All of this suggests that, from a grammatical point of view (i.e. from the 
point of view of event time), the expression of iterativity involves no new type of 
representation. Represented through its conditions of potentiality, an iterative event 
is expressed as a state-like habit one moment of whose existence is depicted by the 
simple form. Represented through its actualization as a series of repeated actions, it 
is depicted by the simple form as an action-like event evoked from beginning to end. 
From a lexical point of view, of course, there is good reason for distinguishing 
iterative events from others, as does Freed. 
Each of the uses examined above has been shown to involve either a total-
duration representation of event time or a momentary representation of event time 
giving rise respectively to an action-like or a state-like event in discourse. Similar 
remarks might be made of the various other uses of the simple form observed so far 
(cf. Gordon 1986 and Hirtle 1967). Thus all the evidence examined to date shows that 
each use of the simple form embodies one of the two time schemata. 
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Meaning and the Simple Form 
At first sight this result suggests that there is no single potential meaning 
discernible behind the simple form since it sometimes evokes the whole of the 
event's duration, sometimes only a moment of it, in a fashion reminiscent of what in 
other languages has been called 'perfective' and 'imperfective'. To conclude that the 
simple form has two basic, irreconcilable meanings would hardly be satisfactory 
because it would amount to proposing two quite distinct simple forms of the English 
verb, a proposal for which there is absolutely no evidence on the level of the 
morphological sign. And yet this conclusion, which is based, as we have seen, on 
the examination of many verbs and uses, would seem to be quite inescapable — at 
least until a curious fact concerning states is taken into account. Thanks to this 
frequently overlooked fact, a unified view of the simple form can be obtained — a 
single meaning underlying the single morphological sign — a view which ultimately 
leads to the realization that the simple form is primarily concerned not with the 
evoking of event time in and for itself, but with evoking event time insofar as it is a 
necessary condition for situating the lexeme in time, i.e. for the representation of 
something as an event. 
The curious fact just alluded to came to light as a result of reflecting on why a 
verb expressing a state is not found in the progesssive form: 
This book deals with the Renaissance. 
It floats! 
An action-like event can, of course, be represented in the progressive, in which case 
it is evoked as incomplete: 
He is dealing with the Renaissance. 
Look, it's floating! 
Even examples of the progressive with verbs that usually express a state can be seen, 
upon close examination of the context, to express a developmental sense, as in: 
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What's he wanting this time, I wonder? 
What I am really meaning w...3 
Examination of usage like this brings to light the fact that a state cannot be seen as 
incomplete. That is to say, whether one represents the whole duration of a state-like 
event, or only a portion of its duration, one has the impression that the state as an 
indivisible whole is somehow evoked. In other words, whatever constitutes a state 
must exist as such at each and every moment of its duration. On reflection it soon 
appears that this characteristic is a necessary consequence of the very nature of an 
entity admitting of no development or change: all its constituent elements must be 
present in time at its very first instant and must persist throughout its every instant. 
A dynamic, action-like event, on the other hand, is developmental by nature and since 
every instant of its duration offers the possibility of change, at no single instant can 
all the impressive elements constituting an action be seen to exist. It follows that to 
obtain a view of all that is involved in a dynamic event one must represent its total 
duration. In short, a state-like event exists as a whole in each of its instants, an 
action-like event only in the complete series of instants making up its duration/* 
It seems then that all uses of the simple form have this in common: they 
evoke the time required to represent the lexeme as a whole in time, as an event. 
3. See Hirtle 1967, pages 52 and 76 for comments on the last six examples. 
4. In Hirde 1967 (p. 26) these two ways of representing event time are depicted in the 
following way, where 1} stands for the first instant, 12 the second instant, etc., and the figure 1 
symbolizes the whole: 
for state-like events: l\ = I2 = I3 = ... = In = 1 
i.e. the situation at the first instant (the content of Instant One) is the same as that at Instant 
Two, etc., and the whole lexical content of the verb is realized in any one of the instants of the 
event's duration; 
for action-like events: Ii +12 +13 +.. . + In = 1 
i.e. a different element of the lexical content may be realized in each instant of the event's 
duration. For an interesting application of this distinction to a problem in Spanish, see 
Chevalier 1977, especially pages 13-15. 
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Granted this view of the simple form, its two time schemata appear as necessary 
consequences of two relations between lexeme and time: the impressions 
constituting the lexeme are seen either to coexist in time or to arise successively. 
The resulting momentary and full-length representations of event time, which recall 
the representation of space by means of the point and the line, appear to be the only 
representations made possible by this form because there seems to be no other 
relationship possible between a lexeme and its time of duration. 
This view of the simple form as embodying the relation between lexical type 
and time can be illustrated and somewhat refined if we turn our attention for the 
moment to extremely short events. We have already seen that a sentence like: 
The power went off at midnight. 
evokes a sudden transition from one situation to another because went expresses the 
event's complete duration — beginning, middle (reduced to an instant) and end in 
rapid cadence. A very different effect is produced by a sentence like: 
It was exactly midnight. 
Here there is no impression of something happening suddenly, but rather of the 
momentary existence of a state with no view of its coming into existence or going 
out of existence. That is to say, even here where we know from other sentence 
elements that the state cannot last more that an instant, there is no representation of 
its beginning or ending. As noted above, this same impression — the existence of 
an event, not its happening — characterizes all states so there appears to be good 
grounds for suggesting, as in Smith (1983) that event time as represented in any verb 
expressing a state-like event excludes a view of the beginning and the end of the 
event 
The verb to know provides us with another illustration of this difference 
between the two types of time representation. In a typical use such as: 
He knew the answer. 
knew merely evokes a moment in the existence of the state of being aware, of 
having knowledge. However in Vendler's example (p. 112): 
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And then suddenly I knew! 
knew , thanks to a lexical shift, evokes the transitional, achievement-type event of 
becoming aware with its beginning, middle and end, giving the impression that 
something happened. This is a good example of how, through polysemy, most any 
verb can express now one type of event, now another, as mentioned above.5 
Such examples lend confirmation to the analysis of time schemata presented 
above but they also raise a question: why does a state-like event, even a very short 
one, exclude any representation of its beginning and ending? A moment's reflection 
on the nature of a state and of these two liminal instants suggests why they are 
incompatible. Of all the instants constituting the duration of an event, two 
necessarily involve change: the instant when the event comes into existence and the 
instant when it goes out of existence. Since a state is by nature absolutely 
homogeneous offering no possibility of development or change, its event time 
cannot include any representation of the inherently transitional instants of beginning 
and end. 
Thus if the impressive elements constituting the lexical content of a state-like 
event remain unchanged from instant to instant there appears to be no possibility of 
evoking the two liminal instants of transition as part of the event. By the same 
token, the heterogeneous, developmental nature of an action-like event, whose 
impressive constituents are variable from instant to instant, calls for a representation 
of these two instants precisely because they involve transition. Furthermore this 
development from one phase of the event to the next is not limited to the initial and 
final phases — the onset and the coda, to borrow Freed's terminology — but may be 
found from moment to moment throughout the middle or nucleus of the event. That 
is to say, since any instant of a developmental event involves, or at least may 
involve, change, it must be represented as transitional, as allowing for development, 
as providing the conditions producing the situation that prevails at the next instant. 
In short, each instant is represented as conditioning the following instant in action-
like events. 
5. A different interpretation of such uses is found in Smith (1983: 485), where they are 
classified as states even though they do not exhibit those characteristics on which this type of 
event was originally based. 
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This way of viewing event time suggests a fundamental difference between the 
two types of event, a difference which helps account for a fact noted above: that the 
subject is often felt to carry out an action-like event but never a state. Because each 
phase or even instant prepares for and gives rise to the succeeding one in a dynamic 
event, its event time involves a sort of causal linkage to constitute a closely knit 
series of phases or instants making up the event's duration. In the case of stative 
events on the other hand there is no conditioning link between one phase or instant 
and the next because there is nothing to change or bring about That is, each instant 
of a state exists on its own without any influence on the following instant; as a 
consequence the continuation of a stative event depends solely on the existence of the 
subject continuing unchanged insofar as the particular circumstances evoked by the 
verb are concerned. The subject does not 'perform' or 'do' a state; by merely 
persisting without alteration it ensures the persistence of the event. Hence statives 
are not agentive. This differs markedly from action-like events where the chain of 
conditioning relationships through which the event is realized is attributed to the 
subject with the result that the subject is often felt to do something, to perform the 
action or bring about the event. 
Representing the duration of an event in this way — either as one of a series 
of independently existing instants or as a set of instants each conditioning the 
following — permits us to account for an even more marked effect on the level of 
usage. In the former case any moment of the event can be evoked without 
presupposing anything about the existence or non-existence of other moments of the 
event: each moment is seen in and for itself, although other elements in the sentence 
may suggest that the event is lengthy or short, as we saw above. In the case of 
action-like events however, each moment gives rise to the following in a chain of 
conditioning moments so that the subject is seen as actualizing the whole event from 
beginning to end. Often however there is the impression arising from our experience 
that the subject's role in producing an action-like event has been cut short. To 
represent a dynamic event where the subject has not exploited all the conditioning 
links involved — has not realized the event from beginning to end — English must 
resort to another form, the progressive. By the same token, in situations where each 
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moment is self-sufficient the impression of unrealized conditioning factors cannot 
arise. This is why verbs expressing a state are not found in the progressive.6 
If the foregoing considerations give a faithful reflection of the time schemata 
consignified by the simple form, that is, of how the duration of an event is 
represented grammatically, then we can get some idea of the fundamental unity of 
this form as a way of thinking an event, as a mental mould. In both types of event 
the simple form evokes a sufficient stretch of its duration for all the impressive 
constituents, the lexical import, signified by the verb to be situated in time. The fact 
that in stative events these constituents are seen to exist simultaneously whereas in 
dynamic events they are seen to come into existence successively gives rise to two 
different ways of representing event time, but it remains that in both cases the simple 
form provides the means for representing the total lexical import as an event, and in 
this sense it is a perfective. When one considers a verb in the simple form from this 
point of view one gets the impression of a lexico-grammatical whole, of a one-to-one 
correspondence between the lexical and the durational, of an integral view of the 
impresssive constituents and the time required to ensure their existence as an event. 
This very integrality of the lexical and the grammatical is what the form itself, as a 
single word, evokes. Moreover this is basically what distinguishes it not only from 
the progressive but from every other form of the verb. In fact if the views presented 
here are well founded, we are finally in a position to examine the most far-reaching 
and least understood of the dichotomies in the English verb, that between simple and 
compound forms. 
Walter H. Hirtle 
Université Laval 
6. The attempt by some scholars to account for the infrequent use of such verbs as to 
know in the progressive by calling them 'stative progressives' not only clouds the issue of 
usage but conflicts with the expressive effects observed here. The whole question merits more 
detailed discussion than can be given it in this article. (Cf. Hirtle 1967:69-84 for a summary 
treatment) 
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